always seemed more appealing to the young southerner than to people in other sections. Only in this latter sense can one perhaps speak of the "southernization" of America as a whole. There seems to be a resurgence of American reverence for a wild, interior frontier, for a purer naturalism; this too has its southern roots as surely as the mythical cowboy of the West.

See also HISTORY AND MANNERS: Frontier Heritage; Military Tradition; LAW: Criminal Justice; Criminal Law; Police Forces; RECREATION: Football

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Civil Rights, Federal Enforcement

Prior to 1957 federal intervention to protect the legal rights of black southerners was infrequent at best. Beginning with the Little Rock crisis, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and the creation of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, however, a new era of federal legal action in the South was born.

From 1957 through the late 1960s federal authorities faced three major and often intertwined legal questions concerning the South: how to ensure southern blacks' right to register and vote; how to secure the desegregation of southern schools and colleges; and how to protect civil rights activists from illegal and often violent harassment of their efforts. On all three fronts federal officials—in the White House, at the Department of Justice, and in the Federal Bureau of Investigation—acted cautiously and conservatively in all but a few instances. That caution of three successive presidential administrations—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—was strongly condemned by civil rights movement participants and supporters. At the same time, most white southerners failed to appreciate that the degree of federal action and intervention was much lower than could well have been the case, given the formal powers available to the federal authorities.

Critics of these administrations consistently pointed out that federal authorities were making only the most limited use of certain powers at their disposal: the voting rights provisions of the 1957 and 1960 civil rights acts; the Reconstruction-era criminal statutes codified as 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242; the statute giving the president very expansive federal police powers in any circumstance where state authorities are unable or unwilling to protect constitutional rights (10 U.S.C. 333); and the provisions authorizing all FBI agents and U.S. marshals to make warrantless arrests for any violation of a federal statute that they witnessed (18 U.S.C. 3052, 3053).

The degree of federal restraint was not a matter of happenstance, nor, as some have surmised, was it simply a result of presidential inability to mobilize the resources and energies of the FBI, whose longtime director, J. Edgar Hoover, was accurately regarded as an extreme conservative in matters of race. Instead, in all three areas—schools, voting, and violence—limited federal intervention was based on a straightforward policy supported by all the presidents and attorneys general who were involved: that the racial transformation of southern society would proceed furthest, fastest, and with the fewest scars if federal authorities encouraged maximum voluntary compliance by southern officials and resorted to the coercive use of federal remedies and manpower as little as possible.

Throughout the 1957–64 period Justice Department officials seeking to eliminate racial discrimination from southern voter registration offices made persuasion their first and foremost tool. Only in counties or parishes where registrars rebuffed such approaches and continued to discriminate were federal civil suits brought. Similarly, even in such widely heralded federal-state confrontations as the integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962 and the University of Alabama in 1963, federal officials relied upon private conversations and negotiation and employed actual force only when all other means of obtaining obedience to the law had failed. Furthermore, even in instances where the very lives of civil rights activists were in danger, Justice Department officials moved with caution rather than alacrity. Many movement workers became deeply embittered at the lack of federal response to the shootings, burnings, and beatings that occurred throughout the Deep South between 1961 and 1965.

The summer of 1964 witnessed both a new assertion of federal power in the most violent of the southern states, Mississippi, and passage of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act. Prodded by the murder of three civil rights workers in June 1964, the Johnson Administration established a substantial FBI presence in the state. At the same time, passage of the new law gave the government a powerful new tool for combating racial discrimination,

MISSING CALL FBI

THE FBI IS SEEKING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE AT PHILADELPHIA, MISSISSIPPI, OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS ON JUNE 21, 1964. EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED TO LOCATE GOODMAN, CHANEY, AND SCHWERNER, WHO ARE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

ANDREW GOODMAN — JAMES EARL CHANEY — MICHAEL HENRY SCHWERNER

RACE:	White	Negro	White
SEX:	Male	Male	Male
DOB:	November 23, 1943	May 30, 1943	November 6, 1939
POB:	New York City	Meridian, Mississippi	New York City
AGE:	20 years	21 years	24 years
HEIGHT:	5'10"	5'7"	5'9" to 5'10"
WEIGHT:	150 pounds	135 to 140 pounds	170 to 180 pounds
HAIR:	Dark brown; wavy	Black	Brown
EYES:	Brown	Brown	Light blue
TEETH:		Gold; none missing	
SCARS AND MARKS:		1 inch cut scar 2 inches above left ear.	Pock mark center of forehead, slight scar on bridge of nose, appendectomy scar, broken leg scar.

SHOULD YOU HAVE OR IN THE FUTURE RECEIVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE WHEREABOUTS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO NOTIFY ME OR THE NEAREST OFFICE OF THE FBI. TELEPHONE NUMBER IS LISTED BELOW.

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
TELEPHONE, NATIONAL 8-7117

June 29, 1964

FBI poster seeking information on missing civil rights workers, Mississippi, 1964

particularly in public accommodations. Even in relative "hot spots" such as St. Augustine, Fla., and Selma, Ala., federal officials favored persuasion and conciliation before adopting stronger actions.

Passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which provided for the appointment of federal registration officials in unregenerate southern counties, led many movement activists to expect the kind of extensive federal intervention throughout the South that the movement had sought but previously failed to obtain. To their great disappointment, however, federal officials at the Justice Department again applied the principle they had followed in previous years: direct federal authority should be exerted only where state and local officials failed to show good-faith compliance. Thus, far fewer federal registrars were sent into the South than civil rights proponents requested. A movement initiative to win passage of new federal statutes to eliminate jury discrimination and to specifically forbid any physical harassment of civil rights workers also failed to succeed in 1965–66.

Many movement participants and sympathizers, looking back at the so-called Second Reconstruction years, argue that a more aggressive and forceful federal stance would have meant more racial progress, and at a lesser cost in dead, wounded, and emotionally scarred. Former federal officials, however—those men who served in the Justice Department hierarchy in the 1960s—believe that what many view as the South's tremendous racial progress since the late 1960s would not have occurred and that much of the previous bitterness would not have subsided had not the federal executive branch followed the moderate and restrained path that it did. Had federal authorities employed more heavily the coercive and punitive powers at their disposal, deep racial divisions might well have been further deepened and also prolonged. One's view of how sufficient the changes in southern race relations over the past 15 years have been will in large part determine whether one judges the federal law enforcement stance of the 1960s to have been intelligent or inadequate.

See also BLACK LIFE: Freedom Movement, Black; LAW: Civil Rights Movement; MEDIA: Civil Rights and Media

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Carl M. Brauer, *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* (1977); Richard Maxwell Brown, in *Perspectives on the American South*, vol. 1, ed. Merle Black and John Shelton Reed (1981); Haywood Burns, in *Southern Justice*, ed. Leon Friedman (1965); Robert K. Carr, *Federal Protection of Civil Rights: Quest for a Sword* (1947); John Doar and Dorothy Landsberg, U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings—Federal Bureau of Investigation*, vol. 6, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (1976); John T. Elliff, *Perspectives in American History*, vol. 5 (1971); Allan Lichtman, *Journal of Negro History* (October 1969); Neil R. McMillen, *Journal of Southern History* (August 1977); Burke Marshall, *Federalism and Civil Rights* (1964).

Cockfighting

Ritualized violence is an integral aspect of many sports, and the extreme of recreational violence can be found in the so-called blood sports. In these activities animals are pitted against each other, usually with fatal consequences for the loser, while spectators wager on the outcome. Cockfighting, dogfighting, and bearbaiting were brought to the United States by early settlers from the British Isles where such activities have a long tradition.

Cockfighting is the most common organized blood sport in America and may have as many as several hundred thousand devotees. Fights are regularly scheduled at hundreds of permanent arenas or "pits." Many cockpits are quite elaborate and may be equipped with refreshment stands, public address systems, and tiers of bleachers. There are three national publications for "cockers," as cockfighters call themselves, including the oldest, *Grit and Steel*, founded in 1899. They even have a lobbying group, the United Gamefowl Breeders Association.

Though cockfights occur throughout the country, a disproportionate number of fans are found in the rural South. A recent survey of cockers (Bryant and Capel,